Introduction
Spain's infrastructure policy over the last decade has been characterized by an almost overwhelming degree of public investment that has, however, been largely unrelated to current or prospective demand. This situation has affected all interurban modes of transport. Indeed, the country's policy managed to exacerbate the mismatch between supply and demand well before the economic crisis set in and provoked further reductions in demand. The reality of the situation is even acknowledged in the current Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI, 2012) , in a section devoted to conducting a policy diagnosis [Part II, p. 57] : "Nonetheless, in recent years planning has focused on, and given priority to, the continued expansion of the system's supply without any direct correlation existing with growth in demand". Paradoxically, at around the same time, the Spanish Minister of Transportation and drafter of the Plan was recorded as saying in a speech in favor of maintaining government plans for extending the high-speed rail (HSR) nationwide: "I don't want an asymmetric Spain (…) How do I explain to the Spaniards that the people of one region are more important than those of another".
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Even in the throes of the current economic crisis, the Spanish government continues to spend large amounts of resources on its HSR (c. 3,300 million euro in 2013, amounting to 33% of total central investment in transport infrastructure) and to build motorways on routes that carry little more than 1,000 vehicles per day. Under such a framework, the economic crisis can only worsen the mismatch between capacity and traffic with telling consequences for government budgets and future generations of tax payers. Indeed, the Assessment of the 2013 national reform programme and stability programme for Spain, issued by the European Commission on 29 May 2013, reports that: "More stringent cost-benefit analysis of proposed projects is needed to avoid further overinvestment and to optimize existing infrastructure. The 2013 NRP presents some conflicting goals for transport policy, e.g. reduction of the operation costs of the network and continued construction of high-speed railway lines. " (p. 33) In this paper, in addition to presenting evidence of Spain's overcapacity in all transport modes, we analyze the contribution made by institutional and regulatory policies to the existing and 1 Presentation of Spanish proposals for the Trans-European Transportation Network. Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid, 12 February, 2012.
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Working Paper 2014/09, pag. 5 5 prospective oversupply and to the mismatch between traffic demand and (transport) capacity supply. This is examined both in network and single modes of transportation. By so doing, we provide further explanations for an overall design that has permitted the extreme imbalance in the present-day system. The Spanish experience, therefore, provides an example of the waste of public resources on overambitious programs of investment in underutilized infrastructure. Revealing the institutional and regulatory design that provided the mechanisms for such an irrational policy should, in itself, be a valuable lesson for any country seeking to modernize and improve its transport infrastructure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a detailed description of the extent of the system's current overcapacity and the mismatch between supply and demand by examining the statistics for each transport mode in an international benchmarking assessment.
Second, we examine the rationale of the regulatory framework supporting the management and investment policies for high capacity networks (motorways and HSR) and single point-to-point infrastructure (airports and ports). Finally, we present our conclusions and discuss the policy implications that can be derived from the extreme case of mismatch between and traffic demand and capacity in Spain.
Spain's infrastructure policy: When supply travels far beyond demand
Spain is -by a long way -the country whose infrastructure supply (including both interurban and long distance modes) has grown most in recent years. However, demand has not kept pace with the increase in supply -truth be told, this mismatch was evident even before the economic crisis set in at the end of the last decade. For this reason, the Spanish case has come to be seen as a paradigmatic case of the wasteful use of public resources for the building of infrastructure. This section presents data that allow a comparison to be made of the infrastructure supply in Spain with that available throughout the EU and other countries. The mismatch between infrastructure and demand is also described in greater detail.
Beginning with surface networks, there can be little doubt that if anything has come to characterize Spain's infrastructure policy since the early 2000s it has been the extension of the country's high-speed rail based on the laying of new tracks and dedicated almost exclusively to passenger transport. Successive Spanish governments have presented their investment achievements at both domestic and international forums. The dedication of massive budgetary resources has Spain is also the European Union country with the most extensive motorway network. At the end of 2011, it covered a distance of 14,554 km (a figure that does not include dual carriageways).
In 2010, the last year for which Eurostat provides homogeneous data for almost all EU countries, Spain already had 14,021 km of motorway in service, followed by Germany with 12,819 km. In relative terms (i.e., km of motorways per million inhabitants), Spain, with more than 300 km per million inhabitants, was ranked well above all other large and medium-sized EU countries, as shown in Table 3 . The population density of the motorway network in Spain is surpassed only by that of Slovenia and Cyprus, small countries with small populations and characteristics that are not really comparable. Clearly, the fact of having a more extensive motorway network does not mean that the traffic volume will be equally great. In order to compare the intensity of use of motorway networks in Europe, we draw on the data provided by the International Transport Forum (OECD) for road passenger traffic in 2009. Table 4 shows these figures and calculates the ratio for the total number of passenger*km (pkm) over the length of the whole network. We find that the number of million passenger-km per km of motorway in Italy was 4.3 times higher than that in Spain; in Germany it was 2.6 times higher while in France the volume of traffic was 2.8 times greater. euro per ton. This figure is well above that of all other countries in the EU as Table 6 illustrates: for instance, it is 3 times that of Italy and Germany, 3.7 times that of Portugal and 7 times that of France. As can be seen, over-investment and the mismatch between supply and demand have been the most salient features of Spain's infrastructure policy, affecting all interurban modes of transport.
The over-investment of recent decades follows a long-term pattern in Spain's infrastructure policy that is not driven by the requirements of mobility and economic activity, but rather by the desire to centralize transportation on the country's political capital (Bel, 2011 and 2012; Albalate, Bel, and Fageda, 2012) . This priority for connecting all provincial capitals to Madrid was established by the Second Law of Railways, introduced in 1870 (Bel, 2011) . More recently, on 25 April 2000 (in the investiture debate preceding the 2000-2004 legislation), the Spanish government once again made it a priority to connect all provincial capitals to Madrid with its plan for the HSR network. Likewise, the development of the motorway network has usually responded to this same priority, especially when it has involved funding from the state budget (Bel, 2012) . To achieve this objective, the geography of Spain and the coastal location of the country's main metropolitan areas (with the exception of Madrid) made the development of particularly long rail and road networks necessary, especially in comparison with the networks of Spain's European neighbors. However, this overinvestment in transportation infrastructure, and especially spending on such facilities as airports and ports, cannot be explained solely in terms of centralization. We need to examine other motives, including the political influence wielded by the powerful construction sector -one of Spain's leading economic sectors (Bel, Estache, and Foucart, 2014) , whose may also account for overinvestment in other policy areas, such as the building of local facilities in a range of different fields.
Given Spain's low population density, the low concentration of population in the areas surrounding Madrid, and the distribution of economic activity throughout Spanish territory (see 
Institutional and regulatory causes of mismatch 3.1 Network modes
High capacity network modes have received -and, in fact, continue to receive -the largest share of Spanish investments in transport infrastructure. As a result, they also provide an obvious illustration of the mismatch that exists between infrastructure supply and demand. Taxpayer subsidies, together with the massive arrival of European funds for high-speed rail and free motorway projects, and the offer of favorable guarantees and the negotiation of risk mitigation agreements for private toll motorway projects, are among the main factors fueling this mismatch in network modes.
Motorways
Spain's motorway network, which is under central government regulation, is characterized by a mixed funding model in which 75% of motorways are free, while the remaining 25% are tolled and privately operated. This duality can be accounted for by the different models that have been adopted in each of the three main waves of motorway investment in the country (Bel, 1999) . Overall, Spain The first motorways in Spain were opened to traffic under the dictatorship, which chose a privately toll motorway concession model to develop the network. Private motorway projects involve great uncertainties in terms of demand and cost risks, while private screening can be expected to provide profitable projects as it allows the selection of routes on the basis of predicted traffic volumes. However, the private advantage of being able to avoid white elephants is only possible with the right allocation of risk. In this regard, the dictatorship offered various guarantees and risk mitigating mechanisms including exchange rate insurance, an economic-financial breakeven guarantee and State-endorsed foreign debt (Bel, 1999) . 6 Under these regulations, the Motorway Plan projected a frenzied construction effort of 6,430 km of tolled motorways in just over a decade. However, the international economic crisis of the seventies was to highlight the important mismatch between projected capacity and actual traffic. Eventually, only 2,042 km of construction were awarded and by the 1980s only about 1,800 km were actually in operation.
Moreover, part of the industry had to be rescued through a process of renegotiation and nationalization.
In the late 90s and in the years that followed, the democratic central government continued to award new private toll motorway concessions and to offer similarly favorable guarantees.
However, the most heavily used corridors were by now already covered by previous investmentsboth private and public. Consequently, most of the new motorways built (above all, those constructed to provide additional access routes to Madrid's six existing motorways) are proven white elephants -with traffic volumes in some cases (the R2 concession, for example) at just 34% of expectations. The use of these motorways has been badly undermined by existing free parallel motorways, while their profitability has been hit by huge (unexpected) expropriation costs. Baeza and Vasallo (2012) report a significant bias towards the overestimation of traffic volumes on Spanish toll motorways. They argue that such overestimation is a strategic move given the possibilities for renegotiating concessions. Indeed, the State has been shown to have secured 5 This 2012 figure is obtained from the Ministry of Transport and includes free motorways, tolled motorways and free dual carriageways, which are technically similar but not the same as free motorways. Note that the figure is higher than that reported in Table 3 (section 2), as there we consider a technically homogeneous identification of motorways as provided by Eurostat. 6 In spite of regulations favoring foreign investments, concessionaires were solely domestic. Interest in attracting capital from international financial markets was a strategy used to improve the Spanish balance of payments. Specifically, exchange rate insurance was provided to facilitate foreign private investment.
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The free motorway network is fully funded from the government budget and received its latest boost from large scale investment programs between 1984 and 1993. The switch from toll to free motorways was adopted in part because private initiative was unable to provide coverage in regions with low traffic volumes. Motorway plans in this period acquired a centralized design, connecting
Madrid to provinces in the periphery. The impressive growth in levels of investment was possible in part to the massive arrival of European funds that targeted specific regions, but without any consideration of traffic volume. Unlike the toll motorways, this free network has been extended constantly since 1984.
Since 1993, however, Spanish governments have not operated a strategic plan for the country's motorways. Only selected projects have been presented in a number of investment programs, but no specific criterion has been applied as regards capacity enlargements. Technically, it is generally accepted that conventional roads should be converted into high capacity roads when they reach an average daily traffic of around 15,000 vehicles -or 10,000 when congestion is severe or heavy traffic represents a share of 15% or more. Yet, in Spain, current plans drawn up by the central government provide for the conversion into motorways of several roads with traffic volumes below 2,000 vehicles per day -examples include the routes Cuenca-Teruel (1,399 daily vehicles), HuelvaZafra (1,409 daily vehicles) and Alcolea del Pilar-Caminreal (1,975 daily vehicles). There are at least five more such enlargement projects with daily traffic volumes below 4,000 vehicles (Macias and Aguilera, 2013) .
As for toll regulation, initial tolls are fixed at a rate that will guarantee the economic-financial breakeven of the private concessionaires. Regulatory price rules for toll motorways have evolved over time, but have always been established by law. The first concessions provided for toll updates calculated on the basis of complex polynomial equations that were dependent on the growth in inputs and materials required for construction; moreover, they were specific to each concession.
The concessionaires though complained for years that such equations were only truly applicable in periods of construction, and eventually it was agreed to revise this rule. The central government opted for regular review so as to avoid involvement in constant automatic bilateral negotiations and to ensure updates that downgraded the system's rigidity. Royal Decree 210/1990 substituted the earlier rule with an automatic update that was fixed at 95% of the rise in the consumer price index. Working Paper 2014/09, pag. 16 16
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The latest stage in price regulation was initiated in 2001. The mechanism involves a price cap rule, which in turn is based on the difference between projected and actual traffic on each motorway. This price cap system represents an attempt to link price changes to the actual evolution in traffic so that extraordinary profits can be tied to reductions in real toll prices (Albalate, Bel, and Fageda, 2009 ).
In spite of these changes, price regulation has played no significant role in the over-investment bias over time, especially if we consider that a large part of the Spanish network is free, which leads to well-known incentives to overinvest. Indeed, free motorways and fuel taxes are common occurrences worldwide and they have not necessarily led to oversupply. However, oversupply cannot be achieved without resorting to the budget. Even the concession contracts designed in Spain for the construction, operation, and maintenance of toll motorways have been characterized by a limited transfer of risk to private investors: first, as a result of guarantees awarded to ensure construction cost recovery; 7 and, second, as a result of lax equity to debt ratio requirements.
Consequently, concession contracts result in only a limited transfer of financial risks to the private sector, which impedes the construction of projects that might be sustained by economic activity and mobility alone. As such, both budget financing and private financing with subsidies and guarantees may result in oversupply, but not all countries with toll or free models inevitably produce oversupply. Ultimately, it is the objectives and the design of a country's transport infrastructure policy that determine the financing instruments that are to be adopted.
Additional interpretations of the oversupply of free motorways include the satisfaction of shortterm goals, such as winning political elections (Castells and Solé, 2005) , and long-term objectives, such as centralization (Albalate, Bel, and Fageda, 2012) . The latter inevitably requires budget financing because of the low density corridors that connect the political capital with a number of the country's peripheral cities. As a result, oversupply is dictated by policy design and the financial mechanism adopted is simply the instrument derived from that design.
High-Speed Rail
High-speed rail has been at the heart of Spain's transport policy. Even in the 2013 budgetwhich included major cuts for education, health and social security -HSR was allocated 3,302 million euro, 71% of all investment for railways and 33% of the total investment provided by the Table 1 Competition is not allowed among passenger traffic in Spain and the characteristics of the country's infrastructure -distinct from those of conventional railways -are incompatible with freight transport. High-speed rail links have concentrated all of Spain's modernization efforts in the passenger-related railway sector, with no interest for freight transport, which today suffers severe bottlenecks along the main corridors. As a result, Spain's freight rail transport presents one of the lowest (and decreasing) market shares in Europe, standing at just 2.5%. 10 As such this is the principal opportunity cost of investment efforts in passenger oriented high-speed rail, which should come as no surprise if we consider that ports and UIC-gauge railways have yet to be linked up in 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública Document de Treball 2014/09, pàg. 18 Research Institute of Applied Economics
Working Paper 2014/09, pag. 18 Spain. Indeed, the first project of this kind did not take place until 2012, when the Port of Barcelona was connected with a minor single dedicated track.
The declared intent of connecting all provincial capitals to Madrid by HSR was not supported by any mobility patterns or transport needs. As a result, taxpayers, together with European funds (which account for around a quarter of project investments), have borne the brunt of the expense of the high-speed rail program (See . 11 This has come about, first, because infrastructure investment has been fully subsidized, without any expectation of recovering costs via user fees. 12 Moreover, infrastructure user fees do not fully cover the maintenance costs of the network and its railway stations. In fact, these fees are insufficient to recover even the variable costs of high-speed rail in many corridors. If we assumed a fee rate that made the recovery of variable costs possible, even for projects with a demand twice that of the Madrid-Barcelona line, subsidies would be required for up to half the marginal cost value (Albalate and Bel, 2012, p. 104) . As a result, the infrastructure has to be fully subsidized, as does the rolling stock in part (even though it was purchased by RENFE). Second, it reflects the fact that, during the early years of operation, prices were heavily subsidized. In this regard, the European Commission prohibited subsidies to cover operating losses on RENFE's long distance services, including its high-speed rail lines, in
2009. This aid had amounted to € 248 million in 2007, and would have risen to € 400 million in later years. None of the high speed lines fulfills public service obligations. All in all, Spain's HSR lines, obtained at great expense, have been built for passenger volumes that fall well short of targets that would justify their existence, as various cost benefit analyses of HSR investments have shown (De Rus and Inglada, 1993; De Rus and Roman, 2006 ). Yet, despite the financial burdens suffered, Spain enjoys the longest HSR network and continues to make a huge fiscal effort to further its expansion.
Single facilities
In Spain, single transport facilities are characterized by a centralized management model of publicly owned monopolies -AENA aeropuertos for airports and Puertos del Estado for ports -under central government control. Although ports and airports are two types of infrastructure that have a 11 It is worth recalling that because of Spain's relief and urban density, the average construction costs of the HSR network have been lower than those in other European countries, and well below those in Italy (See Beria and Grimaldi, 2011) . 12 Note that in France -a country with a very similar network in terms of length -the recovery of infrastructure investments on none of its lines is 0%, whereas in Spain no line has an infrastructure investment recovery higher than 0%. Bel and Fageda, 2010 ).
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14 AENA is the owner of all the facilities provided by Spain's airports and it controls all the financial resources generated by them. All investment plans are drawn up jointly between AENA and the Ministry of Transport, with airport charges being fixed by the Spanish Parliament. All other relevant decisions regarding airport management are made by AENA, including those related to the undertaking of retail activities, the allocation of slots, check-in counters and airline gates.
The centralized management system means that Spanish airports are unable to compete with each other to attract airline services, as typically occurs in other European countries. Furthermore, any financial losses are compensated through a cross-subsidy system. Here, Bel and Fageda (2009) show that the cross-subsidy system is not necessarily driven by a criterion of solidarity as it is usually claimed. On the contrary, a significant positive correlation can be found between investments and GDP per capita, leading to a larger allocation of the resources raised by profitable airports to the richest territories.
As regards revenues, Law 25/1998 fixed the initial values for current aeronautical charges (the fees for landing and aircraft parking, and for terminal use, etc.) and other fees, including car parking 13 The only commercial airport not managed by AENA is Lleida-Alguaire, a small airport that handled just 33,041 passengers in 2012. A further three airports, which do not currently carry commercial traffic, are not managed by AENA. 14 Exceptions do exist; thus airports located in the same urban area tend to be managed by one single firm. This is the case of airports in Paris, Rome and Milan and it was the case of those in London and Glasgow before the break-up of BAA airports.
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Working Paper 2014/09, pag. 20 20 and the retail activities undertaken by AENA. The company operates four airport categories and sets aeronautical charges accordingly (note that within the same category, price differences are minimal). The airports of Madrid and Barcelona are in the first category, the main tourist airports comprise the second, while the other two categories are made up of the airports handling lower traffic volumes. This discrete categorization of regulation, however, fails to allow prices to reflect individual costs, and as such is a significant source of inefficiency.
Any changes to these charges proposed by AENA must receive the approval of the Spanish Parliament. Thus, in theory, airport charges are based on the total costs of all the airports managed by AENA; however, in practice, these charges are approved by Parliament, so they are adjusted annually in line with the charges made for other public services (except in 2011 and 2012 when airport charges in Madrid and Barcelona were increased substantially in relation to those in place at the other airports because of the huge investment debts accumulated in Barcelona and, above all, in Madrid). Thus, while charges are strictly regulated, they do not necessarily cover costs.
It should be noted, therefore, that AENA has recorded financial losses since 2007, making it the airport operator reporting the largest deficit in the world (Bel and Fageda, 2011) . AENA's current debt stands at more than 14,000 thousand million euros. In 2011, only ten airports were profitable and each of them moves more than four million passengers per year. This contrasts starkly with reports for other European airports where the traffic profitability threshold can be as low as one million passengers (European Commission, 2002) .
In short, the poor financial performance of Spanish airports can be attributed to a lack of competition, the cross-subsidy system and the absence of incentives to be cost efficient. All these factors, derived from the centralized management system, have a detrimental impact on the financial accounts of Spanish airports and encourage the tendency to over-invest, which is perhaps the main factor accounting for AENA's current financial distress.
Ports
Public ownership and centralized decision-making on such matters as investment and prices also characterize Spain's ports. However, the Port Authorities have a greater degree of financial autonomy than that enjoyed by the airports since here investments are more closely linked to the
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The two main agencies managing the ports of Spain are Puertos del Estado and the Port Authorities. Puertos del Estado is a state-owned company whose main objectives are to coordinate operations and to approve the Port Authorities' investment plans. The company is financed by four per cent of the total revenues of each Port Authority located on the mainland and two per cent of the revenues of ports situated on islands, and in Ceuta and Melilla.
Spain has 28 Port Authorities managing a total of 47 ports. 16 The Port Authorities are public institutions that have their own legal structure and a president appointed by the regional The regulations provide some scope for price competition through the use of two tools: a correction coefficient and discounts. The correction coefficient is the percentage that each Port Authority can apply in order to modify the fee paid by the shipping companies. The main feature of the correction coefficient is that it involves a "regulation of maximum profits". Thus, a Port Authority with profit levels higher than the national mean has to lower its prices, while a Port Authority with lower profit levels has to increase its prices. Such a regulatory measure however can cause an economic distortion, as the price setting is not necessarily related to the costs of each Port
Authority. The second tool to promote competition comprises the discounts that Port Authorities can apply under certain conditions (regulated by law) to terminal operators and shipping companies.
For each Port Authority, the regulation fixes an upper limit, this being the maximum amount that discounts can represent as a share of the port's total revenue.
Ports in Spain can also receive resources from the "Inter-port Compensation Fund", which sees resources being transferred between ports to compensate for disadvantageous situations arising from hinterland limitations or island locations, and to improve the ports' road and rail accessibility. 15 There have been several changes in the legislation regulating port management in Spain since the early nineties (see Castillo-Manzano et al., 2008 , for details) 16 Other minor non-commercial ports are subject to regional regulation. Document de Treball 2014 /09, pàg. 22 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 22
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To finance this fund, each Port Authority has to contribute up to 12 per cent of their income, with the actual share being determined by its financial status. However, in the case of the Port Authorities of the Canary and Balearic Islands, and of Ceuta and Melilla, the percentage falls 50 per cent.
However, Fageda and González-Aregall (2014) show that the current regulation of port charges does little to foster price competition, while Castillo-Manzano and Fageda (forthcoming) report a tendency towards over-investment in the Spanish port system. Since the early nineties, investment in the Spanish port system has multiplied three-fold (after controlling for inflation). Port Authorities have been accruing debt with financial institutions at a double-digit annual growth rate, so that the accumulated debt more than doubles the total annual revenue for the whole port system. In a similar vein, Hidalgo-Gallego and Núñez-Sánchez (2013) show, by estimating a cost-function for the 1986-2005 period, that most Spanish ports are operating at over-capacity. Hence, the combination of weak price competition and the financial autonomy of the Port Authorities seem to have led to capacity competition and the resulting overcapacity of the Spanish port system.
The role of management, financing and price regulation across modes
Above and beyond the specific features of the models of management, financing and price regulation for each mode of transportation, there are certain common characteristics shared across the modes that allow us to provide a brief, more horizontal review of Spain's transport infrastructure policy and its associations with the existing mismatch between demand and supply. Table 7 summarizes some of these shared features. The origin of oversupply in Spain can be traced primarily to political meta-objectives unrelated to transportation and mobility demands. We refer above all to territorial and administrative objectives of centralization attainable through the development of transport infrastructure (see Bel, 2011 , for an explanation of the historical pattern which saw centralization being made a priority, and the empirical study conducted by Albalate, Bel, and Fageda, 2013 , of the objectives pursued by infrastructure investments in Spain). In addition, the provision of infrastructure in Spain has been understood as an egalitarian policy that measures inequality according to the level of infrastructure available to the country's citizens in terms of its stock and quality of service.
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Given a design based on oversupply, all models of management, financing and price regulation must necessarily adhere to this primary function of the infrastructure policy. As a result, this policy and the provision of transport services will typically be delivered by a centralized public entity: the Ministry itself, in the case of motorways, or specially created public corporations under Ministry ownership, in the case of ports, airports and railways. This explains why Spain is an exception -to comparable European countries -in its joint centralized management of all ports and airports by public corporations. This system permits the transfer of resources from profitable to unprofitable infrastructure and services, which is essential in a transport policy driven by investments that bear no relation to market mechanisms. It also produces highly regulated prices that diverge from the optimal amounts required to sustain national infrastructure networks and any expansions of them. In this regard, Spain is unique among comparable European countries in that it regulates the prices of all transport infrastructure services via laws enacted by its central Parliament.
Furthermore, the financing model is also conditioned by the mismatch between supply and demand because economic activity and mobility are insufficient to sustain the level of infrastructure and the quality of transport services. For this reason, budget financing of the infrastructure network is common in Spain (as we have shown in the subsections devoted to motorways and high-speed rail), to levels that hardly bear comparison with the financing of other European countries.
However, this is not the case of single facilities, financed by user payments. Yet, excess investment has contributed to the current level of debt suffered by the public corporations. As we have seen, in 17 It has been the common claim of successive Transportation Ministers that egalitarian access to such infrastructure as HSR "makes Spaniards equal". See, for instance, a public statement by the current Minister of Transportation in http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/informe-semanal/informesemanal-21-04-12/1382803/ (go to 1h03'40; downloaded 1 March 2014). Document de Treball 2014 /09, pàg. 24 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 24 2012 the corporation responsible for the management of Spain's airports had run up debts of 12,750 million euro.
All in all, a centralized public management system, based on budget financing, strict price regulation and cross-subsidy mechanisms, makes it easier to satisfy the meta-objectives that have led to the enormous oversupply of infrastructure in Spain today.
Discussion and Policy Implications
We have shown that Spain's transport policy in recent years has been characterized by a sizeable mismatch between capacity investment and traffic demand. In this instance, the mismatch cannot be attributed to problems of isolation or accessibility, but rather to programs of public investment and regulatory and institutional mechanisms that have actively favored overcapacity, together with a consistent and long-term pattern of centralization based on satisfying political and administrative rationales, rather than meeting the requirements of mobility and economic activity.
The management of Spain's railways, airports and ports is the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation and it fulfills these tasks on a centralized basis. In the case of motorways a mixed model of management and financing is operated. As such, some motorways are managed by private firms through a concession and financed by the tolls paid by users. All other motorways are managed by the Ministry of Transportation and are financed exclusively from the public budget.
High-speed rail is financed by the public budget (investment) and partially by user payments (operation), while airports and ports are financed through user charges and cross-subsidies.
As for the regulation of user charges, a price-cap is in place for private motorway concessionaires and pricing decisions are linked to specific parameters related to the difference between real and estimated traffic. In the case of the other modes of transport, charges are set annually by law but the criteria used for fixing these prices are not made explicit. However, some similarities exist between motorways and ports, since the Port Authorities can apply discounts under certain conditions regulated by law.
Overall, a centralized system of public management and the fixing of charges in a manner not necessarily related to costs are two significant characteristics of Spain's transport infrastructure policies. Within this context, investments do not often correlate with levels of current or expected demand, but rather seek to satisfy meta-objectives of centralization and equality in terms of the availability and quality of infrastructure. These investments, and the present absence of any Document de Treball 2014 /09, pàg. 25 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 25 economic recovery, impose a large burden on Spain's economic policy via the annual charges on the financing of infrastructure as well as in terms of government indebtedness. Furthermore, current policy imposes another large burden on the Spanish economy, given that fiscal efforts are not devoted to the promotion of productivity gains or the relief of capacity constraints and, as such, have no link with the needs of an efficient economy in times of need.
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Of further concern is the fact that no major reform is foreseen in either current or prospective policies for limiting this overcapacity. Indeed, the current economic crisis and the fiscal constraints being imposed by the European institutions do nothing to prevent the extension of large expensive transport projects that continue to be justified under the same policies as those adopted in the recent past.
As has been argued, today's network modes are the outcome of large investment programs, funded primarily from the public budget, and which have failed to take into consideration future traffic forecasts. Even in the case of private toll motorways, the institutional and regulatory design of concession contracts (and their offer of generalized guarantees) has mitigated the importance of demand risk in the valuation of projects, resulting in similar white elephant projects to those produced by the Government in its free motorway programs. In the case of single facilities, the main problems driving overcapacity can be identified as (1) institutional -due to the centralization of management under publicly owned corporations controlled by the central government; and, (2) regulatory -due to the use of price regulations based on cross-subsidy schemes not justified by public service obligations.
Reforming transport policy in Spain is urgent; yet, recent developments appear to show that current policies are limitless, even though they are having a negative impact on both current and future generations. What is required are measures that seek to link investment and capacity to different service delivery thresholds. This means accommodating investment projects and the modernization of each mode -gradually, when indivisibilities do not apply -to the demand expectations of non-commercial infrastructure. In the case of commercial infrastructure it is imperative that the institutional and regulatory framework be reformed. In this regard, the management of these units should be undertaken on an individual basis and price regulations need to be reformed so as to ensure that fees charged meet costs. However, this will only be possible if the reforms provide a (new) regulation of the public policy process. Document de Treball 2014 /09, pàg. 26 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 26 Spain is the only example among the large and medium-sized countries of the OECD in which absolutely all interurban transportation modes are under central government control.
Regulation and institutional designs are all determined by the Ministry of Transportation (either directly by the Ministry or indirectly by corporate companies owned by the Ministry) and, as shown, they have promoted over-investment. Internationally no executive enjoys a comparable concentration of powers in the transport sector. Thus, institutional reforms need to consider the establishment of an independent regulatory agency for transport (whether this should be modalspecific or cover all modes would be an issue for further research) and one that is outside central government control. This is of pressing interest; especially, if we bear in mind that the Ministry of Transportation itself is aware of the lack of correlation between investment and growth in demand;
yet, the political precepts consider an equal endowment of infrastructures (in terms of both quantity and quality) to guarantee equality between the citizens of different regions.
